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TEN YEAR REVIEW OF COLORADO LAW
FEATURES CONVENTION, OCTOBER 12-14
Eleven of the state's outstanding practitioners and scholars
will present the Ten Year Review of Colorado Law prepared in
cooperation with the law schools as the feature attraction of the
52nd annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association at the
Broadmoor in Colorado Springs, on October 12-14.
These speakers, who will cover over 30 subjects in the institute occupying the Friday afternoon and Saturday morning sessions of the convention, in the Broadmoor Little Theater, are:
Charles A. Baer of Denver, William E. Doyle of Denver, Pierpont
Fuller, Jr., of Denver, William W. Gaunt of Brighton, Warren W.
Lattimer of Pueblo, William L. Rice of Denver, Glenn G. Saunders
of Denver, Kenneth L. Smith of Denver, Frederick Storke of Boulder, Ben S. Wendelken of Colorado Springs, and Charles E. Works
of Denver. The complete list of subject groups which will be
covered are given below, together with the persons responsible
for the preparation of the research.
There are three group meals scheduled for the conventionluncheons on Friday and Saturday, October 13 and 14, and the
annual banquet on Saturday evening-which will also bring to
the association several interesting speakers. The Friday luncheon
will be addressed by Julius J. Wuerthner, outstanding member of
the ABA House of Delegates from Great Falls, Montana. Jack
Foster, friendly Editor of the Rocky Mountain News, will leaven
the professional gathering with some of his personal sagas at the
Saturday luncheon, and the wit of the Hon. R. Hickman Walker,
former Justice of the Supreme Court and general counsel for
the Security Life Insurance Co., will enliven the annual banquet
on Saturday evening. On the latter occasion President James K.
Groves of Grand Junction will signal the end of his administration and the beginning of a new bar association year by passing
over the gavel to President-elect Edward G. Knowles of Denver.
The business session and election of officers will occur on
Saturday afternoon, October 14, in the Little Theatre of the
Broadmoor. Several hard-working committees are submitting
annual reports which promise to make this meeting a lively one.
Meetings will be held on Thursday, October 12, for the following associations and sections: District Judges Association, County
Judges Association, District Attorneys Association, Water Law
Section, Patent Section, and Junior Bar Section.
The Friday morning session will be divided between the Probate, Trust and Real Estate Law Section and a symposium on
divorce law under direction of the Domestic Relations Committee.
The following groups of subjects will be covered as part of
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the Ten Year Review of Colorado Law in the institute on Friday
afternoon:
1. Torts, automobiles and damages.
Presented by William E. Doyle, Westminster Law School,
Denver, who also directed the research.
2. Practice, procedure and evidence.
Presented by William W. Gaunt, Brighton.
Research under direction of Vance R. Dittman, University of
Denver College of Law.
3. Property, sales, landlord and tenant.
Presented by Pierpont Fuller, Jr., of Denver.
Research under direction of Frances Hickey Schalow, University of Denver College of Law.
4. Wills, estates and trusts.
Presented by Charles A. Baer, Denver.
Research under direction of Edward C. King and Austin W.
Scott, Jr., University of Colorado School of Law.
5. Domestic relations and fair trade practices.
Presented by Warren W. Lattimer, Pueblo.
Research under direction of Ben S. Galland, University of
Colorado School of Law, and William B. Miller, Denver.
6. Conflicts, security transactions,contracts, and equity.
Presented by Frederick Storke, University of Colorado School
of Law, who also directed the research.
On Saturday morning the following subjects will be covered:
7. Criminal law.
Presented by William L. Rice, Denver.
Research under direction of Max D. Melville, University of
Denver College of Law.
8. Corporations,partnershipand agency.
Presented by Ben S. Wendelken, Colorado Springs.
Research under direction of Clifford W. Mills, Westminster
Law School, Denver.
9. State and local government, public utilities, transportationand
intoxicating liquors.
Presented by Charles E. Works, University of Denver College
of Law, who also directed the research.
10. Taxation and labor law.
Presented by Kenneth L. Smith, Denver.
Research under direction of Albert Menard, Jr., and Wm.
Berg, University of Colorado School of Law, and Chas. J.
Beise, Denver.
11. Water law, constitutional law and eminent domain.
Presented by Glenn G. Saunders, Westminster Law School,
Denver, who also directed the research on water law. Research on constitutional law and eminent domain under direction of Harold R. Hurst, University of Denver.

October, 1950

DICTA

OBSERVATIONS ON THE CRIME PROBLEM*
HON. PAUL L. LITTLER
Judge of the District Court, Seventh Judicial District

The old practice of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth
as a legal method for handling crime was discarded for all practical
purposes some centuries ago, and yet the basic native desire to
exact it is still prevalent in the human breast. The one who is injured clamors for quick retribution to the full extent of the law.
Many are impatient with the law's delays. Mob violence is easily
aroused if the crime is particularly vicious. Others are against
probation, for that does not satisfy their desire that the prisoner
be punished.. Society, generally, places the criminal in a very low
and separate class and keeps him there. He is an "ex-con," and we
shudder a little when we come close to him.
We are inclined to feel that the criminal had a free choice,
that he committed the crime deliberately in the full possession of
his mental faculties, and that he has no one to blame but himself.
He knew it was wrong when he did it, and he deserves the punishment which the law provides. This attitude is often based on
the presumption that the criminal's impulses, emotional makeup,
and ability to make a free choice are similar to our own. These
are some of the premises which should be examined.
Dr. Walter Bromberg, nationally known psychiatrist and author, says in his recent book Crime and the Mind:
The psychiatrist, observing how antisocial psychological drives
affect the individual, cannot wholly endorse the doctrine of free
will in human behavior. It is equally difficult for the sociologist to
form this concept when he notes man's struggle in a frequently
overwhelming environment. . . . Many persons concerned with the
functioning of criminal law have perceived the force of unconscious
determinants in individual criminal behavior, but the majority still
believe that an individual has complete power to decide between
good and evil conduct.

There is a growing tendency among all students of crime to
consider the criminal as a sick individual. This situation led
Wayland F. Vaughan, Professor at Boston University, to say in his
recent text on social psychology:
What does the student of criminology learn that causes him to
become more lenient in his attitude toward the criminal? He learns
that crime results from the impact of certain environmental influences
upon the personality of the malefactor, that unwholesome habits are
acquired under unfortunate conditions of life, that the criminal is
a sick person in the same sense that an individual is said to be
ill when he is suffering from a mental disorder. The criminologist
does not see the criminal as one who has exercised his free will
to choose the path of law violation just for the sake of being anti*Copyright, 1950, PAUL L. LITTLER, Grand Junction, Colo. Published by permission of copyright owner.
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social. Rather he interprets the misconduct in the light of the individual's past-his family background, economic circumstances,
physical deficiencies, mental aberrations, his motives, and the like.

It is recognized that society must be protected from the depredations of criminals, and pending reformation they must be confined in prison. Our short-sighted policy, however, limits our
efforts to apprehending the criminal and getting him behind prison
bars. We seem to fail to realize that he will some day be out
among us again with the same warped personality and emotional
complexes that caused his anti-social conduct in the first place.
Yet we are doing nothing to correct these basic troubles while he
is in prison, thinking that punishment will "teach him a lesson."
No CURE
It was agreed among all of the experts at the Crime Conference held in August, 1949, at Boulder, under the sponsorship
of the University of Colorado, that punishment is ineffective as
a cure or preventive of crime. Professor John B. Waite, a recognized authority on crime and its treatment, said:
PUNISHMENT WITHOUT TREATMENT

Nobody here is trying to get rid of punishment, but the fact is
that punishment alone-punishment in and of itself-does not effectively prevent crime. I don't need to go into that. We all know
it ....
Any pretense that the will to abstain is strengthened by the
experience of punishment is proved by time and observation to be
nonsense.

As Dr. Bromberg says, "Confinement may be necessary, but
of itself, punishment without treatment has no permanent effect
on the ego of the wrongdoer."
The Criminal Justice-Youth Committee of the American Law
Institute formulated a model Youth Correction Authority Act
which has been adopted by several states. In their introductory
explanation of the Act they say:
Traditionally the criminal law has relied upon punishment and
the threat of punishment as the only method of building up resistance to criminal inclinations. But with increasing knowledge of the
causes of human action has come a general realization that reliance
upon "punishment" as the only means of control is logically unsound. Moreover, as a practical matter, punishment as the primary
method of control is not only logically unsound but obviously ineffective. It is not a satisfactory means of social protection against
crime because it does not sufficiently prevent crime. In the first place
the threat of punishment does not notably prevent the commission
of first offenses.

Reason alonie will support these opinions. The criminal's personality is already warped with hostility of varying degree as the
result of an unhealthy family relationship or other environmental
conditions, and punishment tends to increase this hostility. In
other words, hostility begets hostility just as friendliness begets
friendliness. A balky horse never was cured by hitting him over
the head with a single-tree. Only kindness and sympathetic under-
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standing can do that. We do not seem to have learned that lesson
about human beings.
We have not yet reached the place, however, where we can
eliminate punishment. No one advocates that. Nor does it mean
that criminals need be pampered. However, scientific knowledge has advanced to the point where it is known that the criminal's emotional makeup forms the basic cause of his conduct.
Also, the scientific methods of treatment are known. Great advancement has been made in the administration of many state prisons
in the matter of humane treatment of prisoners and their employment in worthwhile activities both inside and outside the prison
walls. While this improved treatment may have some therapeutic
value with certain prisoners, yet we are doing practically nothing
to apply the scientific knowledge which we have directly to the
correction of the emotional ills. Consequently, the prisoner when
discharged comes out with the same basic troubles he had when
he went in. If he is what is known as an occasional or "accidental"
criminal, he will probably get along all right, but if his trouble
is more deep-seated and serious, he is almost sure to be back in
prison again before long.
L. E. Laws, for many years warden of Sing Sing, gives his
idea of the approach to the problem: "Why not say to the boy or
man charged with crime, You have done wrong. Let us find out
about you. We are concerned with your particular act, but also
with your personality. Perhaps we can ascertain the exact nature
of your delinquency. Are your home influences bad? Would teaching you a trade help? Is there something wrong with your physique? Or is your mentality so warped as to necessitate your permament segregation ?"
THE CRIMINAL IN Us ALL

There are many people outside prison walls who have emotional troubles and criminal tendencies as great as those on the
inside. There is no such thing as dividing all human beings into
two classes: criminals and law-abiding citizens with distinct characteristics of each. If you were to visit the state penitentiary and
find the men engaged in the construction of a new cell house or
other structure, you would be unable to distinguish them as a
group from any construction gang on the outside; and the fact is
that there is surprisingly little difference between them.
It is well known that we all have criminal impulses. "There is
larceny in everyone" is a common expression. Dr. Bromberg says,
"Experience with large numbers of complaints of larceny brought
against those convicted of crime leaves no doubt of the presence
of a larcenous impulse in the average person." This is known to
every confidence man. It is the victim's desire and willingness
to accept easy and illegitimate gain that causes him to fall an
easy prey to the wiles of the unscrupulous swindler. Often these
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impulses are not buried as deeply as is sometimes thought. It is
not unusual that a man who is normally considered honest will
take a towel or two from his hotel room or a piece of silver from
the cafe. In the trial of a certain case against a bus company
depot agent for embezzlement, the auditor referred rather flippantly to a practice of agents deliberately overcharging the customer and pocketing the difference as "an old Spanish custom."
The defendant was acquitted.
A desire to do away with an individual who obstructs
one's purpose is not uncommon. We may not be fully conscious
of the impulse and naturally do not give it serious consideration,
but the impulse is there nevertheless. There is considerable significance in common expressions such as "I'd like to murder him;"
"He ought to be shot;" "This will slay you." Children enjoy
Indian and bandit games in which they pretend to kill and get
killed. When they become adults they put away childish games,
but the impulses are still there-perhaps buried a little deeperperhaps not, depending on the child's training and experience in
the meantime. How many today would be guiltless if they were
prosecuted for all of their violations of law? Surely not many,
perhaps none. How many men are strictly honest when they prepare their income tax returns?
THE SOURCE OF ALL CRIMINAL TENDENCIES NOT TRACEABLE

It is undoubtedly true that there are some criminals whose
criminal tendencies cannot conclusively be traced to emotional
difficulties. Some are born mentally deficient; others are what
are known as psychopathic personalties or constitutional psychopathic inferiors. Quite a substantial number of criminals belong
to the latter class; a larger part of the repeaters come from this
group. Psychiatrists are not in agreement on the basic source of
their trouble. Some believe that they are born moral imbeciles and
cannot be changed. Others believe that their difficulty arises from
very early and severe emotional conflicts. Whichever is right, they
are considered as incurable for all practical purposes. However,
in either case it is almost certainly true that environmental influences have an important bearing on their condition.
Of course, it would be impracticable if not unwise to attempt
to treat individually the many thousands of prisoners now behind
bars. In the first place, there are not enough trained personnel
available for that. Furthermore, some of the prisoners are mentally deficient, while others are psychopathic personalities and
may be considered incurable. Still others have such deep-seated
emotional difficulties that it would take many months, if not years,
to get effective results. The prisoners should be screened, and those
offering the best prospect for response to therapy could be treated
first.
However, the treatment of persons who are already in prison
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is only a stop-gap method. The real long-range solution for the
crime problem lies in preventing the development of serious
emotional disturbances in the first place or by correcting it while
the child is still young.
IS CRIME CRADLE-BRED?

It is no exaggeration to say that the basis for deliquency
and crime often begins in the cradle. Almost always the real
cause can be found in the family relationships before the child is
ten years of age, and usually much younger. There may be other
contributing causes such as evil companions, economic stress or
neighborhood environment, but they are only contributing causes.
Dr. Rabinovitch, Chief, Childrens' Service, Neuropsychiatric
Institute, University of Michigan, says:
There are children who have spent perhaps . . . their first
eighteen months or three years without ever having the experience
of mothering; they have never had the stimulation that a mother's
contact gives them. In later life we know that these children are
almost doomed to failure to appreciate social conceptions, and these
constitute a fair number of our seriously delinquent children. There
is nothing that can be done, or very little to be done, when we see
them at the age of ten or twelve.

Most parents understand the physical needs of a child such as
plenty of good food, suitable clothing, exercise, fresh air and
sunshine, but too few understand the general principles of mental
hygiene and the emotional needs of a child. If a child is to become
a normal, happy, contented and successful adult, he must grow and
mature emotionally as well as physically. If he is to grow emotionally, his emotional needs must be satisfied. If they are not,
he will be stunted emotionally just as he will be stunted physically
when his physical needs are not supplied.
What are some of these emotional needs? The first and most
important is plenty of good old-fashioned love and affection. The
importance of love in human relationships is emphasized in I Corinthians, Chap. 13, Revised Version, the second verse of which
reads, "And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all
mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so
that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing."
Virgil, writing still earlier, said, "Love conquereth all." There is
no doubt about the transforming power of love. It is the sine qua
non in family relationship. This does not mean the sentimental,
unintelligent, undisciplined type which anticipates every wish of
the child, which cannot refuse a request or restrain undesirable
conduct. Every child needs discipline, and sometimes firmness is
necessary. He will respond well and favorably if he senses that
it proceeds from a kindly heart and that the parent really and
sincerely loves him. In fact, many mistakes in training can be
made without serious results if the parent's attitude toward the
child is one of true love and affection.
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A newborn baby needs lots of fondling and devoted attention. If the mother is too busy or indifferent and allows the baby
to cry for long periods, he develops a state of anxiety which, if
continued, becomes hostility. Love for parents is an acquired drive,
and if it is not acquired because of the relationship existing between parent and child, then the child as he matures will lack
normal capacity to love others, including his spouse and his own
children, and, of course, will have little regard for others generally. The baby may respond to indifference of parents by negativism. That is, he may just give up, sleep a great deal and not eat
enough. He may become stunted both physically and emotionally.
This type of child is very apt to grow up to be apathetic, lacking
energy and ambition and may develop antisocial tendencies.
It may be thought that an adult cannot be affected by family
relationships which he cannot remember, or that no matter how
a child is treated before he is three or four years old, he, of course,
will have no .memory of it later on, and consequently no lasting
harm will result. However, everyone is a total aggregate or composite of all of his experiences from the time of his birth. In fact,
it is not so often the things in the conscious memory that cause
the most trouble but rather the experiences that have been repressed into the subconscious. Consider a child of two or three
who bites his nails down into the quick-a very common symptom
of emotional disturbance. It is not necessary for that child when
he becomes 16 or 18 to remember the experiences which gave rise to
that emotional disturbance in order that he suffer from the consequences of those experiences. The most serious part about this
early emotional disturbance is that the earlier it occurs the more
difficult it is to correct later on.
OTHER EMOTIONAL NEEDS BESIDES AFFECTION

The child has many other emotional needs. He needs to have
a feeling of security in his home. The foundation of this is affection, and yet it is more. He needs to feel that his home is stable,
a place of refuge free from disrupting quarrels; that his parents
will always be there and will guard him from danger and supply
him with necessities; that he is wanted and approved as a child;
that his individuality is respected. He should be allowed to progress
at his own pace and not be pushed or over-stimulated. He needs
to feel his own worth and establish his self-confidence in response
to praise or rewards promptly given for good conduct or things
well done. His activities should not be unnecessarily restricted
by "don'ts" if he is to develop naturally his abilities and skills
in comparison with other children of his own age with whom he
should have an opportunity to associate. As he grows older he
should be given more independence within the limits of safety
and the rights of others. But he must know that there is a general
pattern of proper conduct beyond which he cannot go. This au-
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thority must be consistent and reasonable, never arbitrary. He
has a right to know why he cannot do certain things. Effort
should be made to teach him to do what he wants to do in an
acceptable manner. That is, if he wants to hammer, he cannot
hammer the piano but he can go out into the back yard and
hammer as much as he wishes. He is not like a piece of clay to be
moulded after a parent's own pattern; he is a separate and distinct personality with his own particular likes, dislikes, interests,
skills and abilities. He should be allowed to form his own pattern
and design while living within the general rules approved by human society. If these natural inclinations and desires are blocked
in order to fit the child into the parents' pattern, trouble will ensue just as surely as if a child who is born naturally left-handed is
required to change to right-handedness.
Within these simple rules lies the road to happiness, contentment, and success; provided, of course, the child is normal physically and mentally. Herein also lies a distinct contribution toward
the solution, not only of a major portion of the crime problem but
also of many other social and personal problems such as divorce,
alcoholism, gambling, insanity, suicide, and even unpleasant dispositions, all of which are or may be symptoms of emotional disturbance.
There are some parents who believe in a rugged type of
discipline with much exercise of authority and a liberal application
of the old woodshed type of technique. A young mother was walking down the street with her small son about three years of age.
He was allowed considerable freedom, and when they came to a
corner, he started down the wrong way. She shouted at him:
"Jimmie! Come back here. Do you want me to twist your ear
again?" His chubby hand went up to his ear as if in remembrance
of a previous twisting. It worked like a charm. The little fellow
stopped and came running back. Such a little child is entirely
dependent upon its parents, and as long as that dependency exists,
physical punishment or fear of punishment will usually secure
obedience.
Assuming that this method is followed by both parents until
this boy gets to be 12 or 14 and they then try this ear twisting
stunt or apply other corporal punishment, what is going to happen? By that time he will have developed a deep seated hostility
toward them without a normal tie of affection and understanding.
He will fight back or openly rebel and perhaps run away. He goes
out into the world, and what does he have in the way of training
for self-discipline? The answer is "nothing." He has only fear of
punishment, which, as he matures, becomes less and less effective
as a deterrent. As he grows older, the hostility which h6 feels
toward his parents is transferred toward other individuals such
as employers or law enforcement officers representing authority
or toward society in general. From here it is a short step to crime.
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THE DESIRE FOR PARENTAL AND SOCIAL APPROBATION

When there is love and affection in the home, obedience is
secured by the desire on the part of the child to please the parent
in order that he may continue to have the love and affection and
approval of the parents. Thus the parent and child are drawn
together with a mutual bond of love and affection, whereas the
punishing, threatening method drives them apart and builds up a
wall of hostility between them. Much the same principles apply
to the relationships between the adult individual and society. It is
the desire of the individual to retain the respect and high regard of
his friends and acquaintances in the community which offers the
greatest deterrent to antisocial conduct.
In the international situation, Albert Einstein, in despairing of armaments and even international courts, says:
In the last analysis every kind of peaceful cooperation among
men is primarily based on mutual trust and only secondarily on
institutions such as courts of justice and police. This holds for nations as well as for individuals.

Over-strict and over-indulgent attitudes toward children are
equally bad. While a too strict attitude tends to build up in the
child a feeling of hostility toward his parents, a too indulgent attitude either anticipates or immediately supplies the wants and
demands of the child so that he never learns to postpone pleasure,
but expects and demands immediate satisfaction. He never learns
to face reality so cannot meet and solve frustrations of any kind.
He lacks self-discipline, and as he grows older he naturally comes
into collision with the rather rigid rules of society. He is totally
unprepared to meet the issue.
Paradoxical as it may seem, it is well-known that certain
individuals have a subconscious emotional need for punishment,
so that the risk of punishment is not only no deterrent to their
criminal impulses, but it actually impels them to commit crime
in order that-this need may be satisfied. Sometimes this is caused
by a subconscious feeling of guilt-perhaps because of a feeling
of hostility toward the parents or a sibling or perhaps because
of something more personal such as masturbation, which they
have been taught to regard as essentially wrong.
It is too much to expect, however, that anyone can grow up
under ideal conditions; hence everyone has some emotional problems. Some parents are unfamiliar with the general principles
of mental hygiene and child culture, and for that reason cannot or
do not apply them. Perhaps the greatest difficulty, however, is
that the parents are themselves either neurotic or at least emotionally disturbed so that their children suffer from the parents'
symptoms, and the children in turn become emotionally disturbed.
This vicious circle has gone on for centuries, and there is abundant
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evidence that the circle is ever widening and that we as a nation
are becoming more and more emotionally immature aiid unstable.
This condition is aggravated by our modern way of life with its
tremendous speed, keen competition, and the impact on the individual of everything that is happening in the world.
MENTAL HYGIENE BEGINS AT HOME AND IN SCHOOL

It is hoped that there will never be developed a system
whereby bureaucratic "experts" will go into homes and instruct
the mothers on how to raise their babies. That problem can be
attacked only through education and teaching the general principles of mental hygiene in the schools--even beginning in the
elementary schools, in order to catch those who drop out. early.
Thus, in a few generations it may be hoped that this vicious circle
can be broken.
Teachers must be trained to spot problem children, and child
clinics with psychiatrists and trained psychologists should be established in connection with the schools to treat these emotionally
disturbed children soon after they enter school, for then they are
most responsive to treatment. We have done much to care for
their physical needs, but their emotional needs have been almost
entirely neglected, although the schools in some of the larger centers are beginning a child clinic program.
In searching for the causes of crime, it is sometimes thought
to be a result of failure to teach good moral principles in the home
by precept and example. All rules of society are artificial and
must be learned. When a man commits a crime, he breaks at least
one of these rules. It isn't because he doesn't know what they
are. What the parents have failed to do is to develop self-discipline in the child-a happy, satisfied desire to live within the rules.
This cannot be done by force, threats of punishment, or in a
spirit of criticism; but only in an atmosphere of love and affection
where the emotional needs of the child are given first consideration.
Crime does not always indicate a lack of moral training. There
is a popular belief that preachers' families contribute more than
their share. This has been shown to be false, but it does happen
often enough to be worthy of some note. Even preachers themselves
are not entirely immune from criminal offenses. An embezzler
is usually a trusted employee whose record for honesty is clear.
He seldom starts out with a thought of stealing, but rather of
borrowing to relieve a temporary emergency and with a sincere
intention of paying it back. A murderer may be strictly honest
in all of his business transactions, but his pride perhaps has been
wounded beyond endurance. Boys, in response to a restless urge,
steal things they do not want and for which they have no use.
The following case history will also serve to illustrate the
point. A boy of seventeen was the son of a successful and well-todo farmer who dominated the family and thought that the children
should be content to spend their time at home away from the
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evils of the world. This boy was not allowed to attend school
functions at night nor to go on school picnics nor attend the
moving picture shows in town.
He wanted to go to high school, but the father refused to
let him go. This boy had always been a "good" boy. He obeyed
his parents and never seemed a problem in any way, although he
had grown rather sullen and had no friends socially. He liked to
drive the tractor on the ranch, but usually he did not handle it
exactly to suit his father and would be required to turn it over
to his older brother after a short try. The days and nights were
very monotonous during the winter months.
One night after the family had gone to bed, he got up and
took his father's .38 automatic and about sixty dollars in money
and started down the road. As he passed a neighbor's house he
saw their late model car in the driveway. He went over to it. The
keys were there so he got in and started off up the road at a high
rate of speed. He had scarecely been away from home before and
did not know just where he was going. He only knew he was
getting away. Several times he almost went off the road. Finally
when he was about two hundred miles from home he ran into a
guard rail and completely wrecked the car, though he himself
was unhurt. He was apprehended immediately and brought back
to face a serious charge of car theft.
ABNORMAL PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT SPELLS TROUBLE

Here was a boy who had been well-cared for physically and
had been raised in a good moral environment and taught to work,
but his emotional needs had not been met, probably through ignorance of the parents who were of foreign extraction. He was not
treated with sympathetic understanding, much less affection;
his likes and dislikes, interests, skills and abilities were not respected, nutured or cultivated. He was not made to feel his own
worth, nor given an opportunity to express himself. He was
allowed no independence of action, even as he was approaching
maturity, but was treated more as a small child, which he remained emotionally. The restrictions became so unbearable that
he tore the bonds asunder and escaped.
Some may think that it was not necessary for him to commit
a crime. He could have merely left home and obtained a job
somewhere, but that would have required facing reality and solving his problem in a logical and approved manner. That would
have required self-confidence and some experience in doing things
on his own. He had never done that. He could steal a car and
run away-an immediate and direct solution, so he thought. He
had always been told what to do and what not to do. He had
never had any opportunity to face problems and solve them himself
in a considered and reasonable manner. He could no more do that
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than he could love his father against whom he held a deep-seated
feeling of hostility.
His reaction when he got away was to do just the opposite
of anything his father had tried to thrust upon him. For an explanation we must return to our first general principle. As. Dr.
Guttmacher, psychiatrist and chief medical officer, Supreme
Bench of Baltimore, puts it, "Psychiatric investigation has confirmed what has been long believed, that deep and secure affection
in early life is as necessary to normal personality development as
sunlight is to the growth of a seedling."
The annual cost of crime in the United States is said to exceed $10,000,000,000. Unless we are willing to spend some money
for an intelligent and scientific approach to the problem, that cost
is sure to increase as it has increased in the past. Every other
method has been tried and has failed. While the expense would be
large at first, it might be confidently expected that the favorable
results would soon reduce the crime bill so that the savings would
more than offset the costs of the program. Furthermore, the byproduct of added happiness, contentment and satisfaction among
the individuals would be immeasureable in dollars and cents.

THE UN COMES OF AGE
October 17 to 24 is United Nations Week in Colorado and
throughout the world. Due to the Korean conflict, it is hardly
necessary to set aside a special week or day to call attention to
our first fumbling experiment with real world government. It
has become a reality in these last few months, even to busy
lawyers, ordinarily too concerned with the battle for daily
bread. Yet with our State Department even now proposing
means of strengthening this machinery, Edward V. Dunklee,
Denver attorney and chairman of Colorado's United Nations
Week celebrations, feels that we should take increased devotion to the great principle of one world under law.
The theme of this year's observance of United Nations
Week is the work of the Children's Emergency Fund. As befitting a state founded upon the gold and silver industry,
Colorado will make a gold and silver collection to this fund.
Collection centers will be set up all over the state, and all
persons are urged to support this humanitarian work by contributions of jewelry, plate and other forms of our precious
metals. Climax of the drive and UN Week in Colorado will
be a pageant and rally at the Denver auditorium on Sunday,
October 22.
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PROCEDURE ON PLEA OF GUILTY*
MAX D. MELVILLE
of the Denver Bar, Assistant District Attorney

Two questions are presented: (1) Is it necessary, under section 482, chapter 48, '35 C.S.A., on a plea of guilty to take evidence
to prove that the offense was in fact committed? (2) Is it mandatory under that section, when the court has discretion as to the
extent of the punishment, that witnesses be examined as to the
aggravation and mitigation of the offense, and, if so, can defendant waive such examination?
The conclusions reached on these questions are these:
1. It is unnecessary, under section 482, chapter 48 (relating
to pleas of guilty), for the court to take any evidence to sustain
a plea of guilty. The plea itself proves the validity of the charge
and every constituent element of the stated offense; for example,
it proves the value of the stolen property in larceny, the intent
in felonious assaults and aggravated robberies, and the knowledge
the goods were stolen in receiving stolen goods.
2. The requirement of section 482, chapter 48, that when the
court ha$ any discretion as to the punishment it must examine
witness as to aggravation and mitigation of the offense does not
contemplate a "trial," since nothing remains to be tried on the
issue of guilt or innocence, and the evidentiary and constitutional
restrictions on trials are waived by the plea. The evidence contemplated by the statute on the questions of aggravation and mitigation is usually entirely different from the evidence which would
be competent and relevant on a trial of the issue of guilt. Although
the requirement as to evidence as to aggravation and mitigation
is mandatory, it may be advisedly and expressly waived by the
defendant.
There appears to be no Colorado authority either way on
some of these conclusions, but most of them are supported by
Illinois decisions; and since the Colorado statute was taken practically verbatim from Illinois, the cases from that jurisdiction
are, under the familiar rule, at least persuasive.
The Illinois statute on pleas of guilty follows,1 and the differences in the Colorado statute are indicated in parentheses:
In cases where the party (indicted shall plead) pleads "guilty,"
such plea shall not be entered until the court shall have fully explained to the accused the consequences of entering such plea, after
which if the party (indicted) persists in pleading "guilty," such
(said) plea shall be received and recorded, and the court (proceed)
shall proceed to enter judgment and execution thereon, as if he
(or she) had been found guilty by a jury. In all cases where the
* Thfs is one of a series of briefs prepared for Colorado district attorneys by
Mr. Melville.
1 ILL. CRIM. CODs, par. 732, Smith-Hurd's Ill. Stat., c. 38.

October, 1950

DICTA

court possesses any discretion as to the extent of the punishment,
it shall be the duty of the court to examine witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense.

I.

NEED FACT OF GUILT

BE PROVED?

The rule at common law is stated as follows :2
Where the prisoner on arraignment confesses the indictment,
or during the trial withdraws a plea of not guilty, a verdict of
guilty on his own confession is entered and the court proceeds to
judgment.

The rule is more fully stated in Green v. Commonwealth :3
There is no principle of the common law better settled or more
familiar than that which declares that whatever crime is duly set
forth in an indictment, of that a party may be convicted. If a jury
would be warranted in finding a person guilty of a particular offense
charged in an indictment, the party accused may confess such offense
by a plea of guilty; in other words, a plea of guilty may be supported
whenever a verdict of a jury finding a person guilty of a crime would
be held valid. A conviction of a crime may be had in two ways;
either by the verdict of a jury, or by the confession of the offense by
the party charged by a plea of guilty, "which is the highest conviction ..
" And the effect of a confession is to supply the want of
evidence ....
When therefore a party pleads guilty to an indictment,
he confesses and convicts himself of all that is duly charged against
him in that indictment.

The general law is stated in Corpus Juris Secundum as follows :4
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, where accused
enters a plea of guilty, or of nolo contendere, the court has the
power and duty to pronounce judgment or sentence as though a verdict of guilty had been found against him, and with the same effect. A judgment so rendered is not violative of accused's constitutional right of trial by jury. To warrant the pronouncement of
judgment or sentence in such case there is ordinarily no need for
evidence establishing guilt, or for any independent adjudication
of guilt; and, although there is authority to the contrary, the right
to pronounce judgment has been said to exist even though the facts
appearing on an examination may indicate that the accused is not
guilty.
SCOPE OF COURT'S DUTY ON PLEA OF GUILTY

Under section 482, chapter 48, '35 C.S.A., the court, on a plea
of guilty, has one duty to perform at all events, and, if it has discretion as to punishment, a second duty. The first is to make certain that the accused fully understands the consequences of his
plea. If he thereafter persists in his plea, the court must receive
and record it. The second duty, if there is discretion as to punishment, is to examine witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation
of the offense.
'2

RUSSELL ON

' 12 Allen
4 24

CRiMEs, 1815-1816

(Mass.)

155, 172 (1866).

C.J.S. Criminal Law, §1563.

(8th ed.).
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The mandatory warning of the accused as to the consequences
of the plea cannot be merely perfunctory. This is illustrated in
Krolage v. People,5 where the Illinois court merely inquired of the
defendant "whether he understood that if he pleaded guilty the
court would sentence him to the penitentiary, and the defendant
thereupon informed the court that he did so understand," and the
court entered the plea without further warning as to his right
to a trial by jury and as to the possible length of sentence.
THERE Is No DUTY TO TAKE EVIDENCE TO PROVE GUILT
It is not the purpose of this paper to contend that a court may
not, if it wishes, take evidence to prove guilt. The point sought
to be made is that it is not legally necessary. It has been suggested
by one judge that the taking of such evidence is mandatory because
the statute requires, where there is discretion as to punishment,
that evidence as to aggravation and mitigation must be taken, it
first must be established by evidence that there is in fact "something to aggravate or mitigate." This view, however, finds no
support in any authority this writer has been able to find.
In the absence of a specific statute, such as that of Michigan
apparently requiring proof of guilt, the universal rule clearly
appears to be that the court is under no duty to take evidence as
to the fact of crime and defendant's guilt, since each element of
the charged offense is proved by the defendant himself when he
advisedly pleads guilty.
The United States Supreme Court has passed upon the present question, where a plea of nolo contendere was involved, in
United States v. Norris.6 There, the Court of Appeals had reversed
a judgment of the District Court denying a motion in arrest of
judgment by one who had entered a plea of nolo contendere upon
the ground that facts stipulated showed him not guilty. One of
two defendants charged with conspiracy to violate the Prohibition
Act pleaded guilty, and the other, Norris, entered a nolo contendere. The district court considered the stipulation of facts for
the sole purpose of determining what punishment should be imposed. The Court of Appeals also considered the facts in the
stipulation on the question of guilt and determined that no offense
had been committed. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals and held that the stipulated facts could not be and should
not have been considered on the question of guilt or innocence,
but could be used only in determining the amount of punishment.
After stating that the indictment was sufficient in form and substance, the Supreme Court continued :7
5224

Ill.456, 79 N. E. 570 (1906).

6281 U. S. 619 (1929).
1 281 U. S. 619, 621 (1929).
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. . . the stipulation was ineffective to import an issue as to
the sufficiency of the indictment, or an issue of fact upon the
question of guilt or innocence. If the stipulation be regarded as
adding particulars to the indictment, it must fall before the rule
that nothing can be added to an indictment without the concurrence of the grand jury by which the bill was found. . . . If filed
before plea and given effect, such a stipulation would oust the jurisdiction of the court ...
After the plea, nothing is left but to render judgment, for the
obvious reason that in the face of the plea no issue of fact exists,
and none can be made while the plea remains of record. Regarded
as evidence upon the question of guilt or innocence, the stipulation
came too late, for the plea of nolo contendere upon that question
and for that case, was as conclusive as a plea of guilty would have
been. And as said by Mr. Justice Shiras in Hallinger v. Davis, 146
U. S. 314, 318: "If a recorded confession of every material averment
of an indictment puts the confessor upon the country, the institution of
jury trial and the legal effect and nature of a plea of guilty have been
very imperfectly understood, not only by the authors of the Constitution and their successors down to the present time, but also by all
of the generations of men who have lied under the common law."
The court was no longer concerned with the question of guilt,
but only with the character and extent of the punishment. . . . The
remedy of the accused, if he thought he had not violated the law,
was to withdraw, by leave of court, the plea of nole contendere,
enter one of not guilty, and, upon the issue thus made, submit
the facts for determination in the usual and orderly way.

In United Brotherhood v. United States," where certain of
the defendants had pleaded nolo contendere on a charge of conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act, other defendants had stood
trial and been convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions on the ground that the trial court had given vitally erroneous, and had refused correct, instructions on a point which
the Supreme Court subsequently, and in other cases, determined
oppositely to the view of the trial court. As to the pleas of nolo
contendere by some of the defendants, the Supreme Court said
that while ordinarily a plea of nolo contendere leaves open for
review only the sufficiency of an indictment, nevertheless in this
instance it would exercise its power to notice plain error in the
interests of justice, and held that such defendants should be given
an opportunity to stand trial in the situation created by the court's
later rulings.
PLEA PROVES ALL ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION

The plea of guilty proves all of the elements of the offense,
such as the value of property in larceny;9 the fact that property
received was known to be stolen and had been retained with intent
to deprive the owner permanently of it ;1o the existence of the person whose name is charged to have been forged ;" the fact of being
8330 U. S. 395 (1947).
People v. Carter, 394 Ill. 78.
' Marx v. People, 204 11. 248, 68 N. E. 436 (1903)
71 N. E. (2d) 737 (1946).
2OPeople v O'Brien, 306 Ill. 340, 137 N. E. 808 (1922).
"People v. Lantz, 387 Ill. 72, 55 N. E. (2d) 78 (1944).
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armed on a charge of armed robbery; 12 the ownership of stolen
property;13 the intent on a charge of assault with intent to commit rape. 14 The court is under no duty to take evidence on a plea
of guilty as to guilt or innocence. 15
The above conclusions are drawn from cases decided under
the Illinois statute which, as has been seen, is in all essential particulars identical with section 482, chapter 48, '35 C.S.A. They
illustrate the proposition that on a plea of guilty, defendant himself, by his plea of guilty, furnishes all necessary evidence to support every element of the charge. This is exemplified by Marx v.

People 16 where it was said:
Under the plea of guilty, it was not necessary for the court to
hear. evidence to determine any matter fully set out in the indictment, as the plea, as shown by the record, is that plaintiff in error
is "guilty of receiving stolen property, knowing the same to have
been stolen. In manner and form as charged therein." Nor do
we think it necessary that the court shall hear evidence as to the
value of the property where the indictment charges and specifies
the value thereof, and the value is alleged as above $15, and it is
sufficient that the larceny charged, by which the goods were obtained,
is grand larceny, and the crime is a felony.
When the plea is "Not Guilty," and the cause is heard by a
jury, the defendant admits nothing, or if upon the trial he admits
the larceny-that is, the taking of the goods-he does not admit
that they were taken feloniously, or that they had any value, nor
does he admit any other matter material to his conviction as charged
in the indictment, but all matters not expressly admitted must be
proved; and in such case the value of the property, being a material
part of the offense as fixing the grade of the offense, must, under
our statute, be proved, and found by the jury, that the court may
know he is justified in imposing the penalty recommended by the
jury, as was the practice in this class of cases prior to the enactment of the parole law, or to enable the court to determine what
penalty to impose where the same is not fixed by the jury.
But where the defendant pleads "Guilty," he pleads to every
fact averred in the indictment, and there is neither law, reason,
nor necessity requiring proof of the things admitted by the plea. ...
The statute requires that, before such plea shall be allowed
to be entered, the court shall fully explain to the accused the consequences of entering it (Hurd's Rev. St. 1901, p. 658, §424), and
the record in this case shows that duty was performed by the
court. Under the indictment in question the court must have told the
plaintiff in error that if he persisted in his plea it would be the duty
of the court to sentence him to the State Reformatory or to the
Penitentiary, according to his age. With these facts before him,
the plaintiff in error entered his plea; and to require testimony
to establish that which the plaintiff in error by his plea admitted
would be to require a useless thing, which the law does not indulge.
2People v. Crevlston, 396 Il1. 78,
IsPeople v. Conn, 391 I1. 190, 62
1"People v. Yukich, 374 Ill. 375,
1People v. Day, 404 Ill. 268, 88
Ill. 403, 82 N. E. (2d) 465 (1948).
10-Supra, note 9.

71 N.
N. E.
29 N.
N. E.

E. (2d) 25 (1947).
(2d) 806 (1945).
E. (2d) 603 (1940).
(2d) 727 (1949) ; People v. Bennett, 401
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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONFESSION AND PLEA OF GUILTY

There is a recognized distinction between a "judicial confession," or plea of guilt, and an "extra-judicial," or out-of-court,
confession. 17 Either kind must be free and voluntary and the
court must be satisfied of that fact. The court itself handles the
matter on a plea of guilty under section 482, chapter 48, '35 C.S.A.,
by its admonition to the defendant, and its inquiry as to his understanding of the consequences of the plea.
But the authorities previously considered seem to be uniform
that no corroboration of a judicial confession is necessary, while
on the other hand there can be no valid conviction on the basis
of an extrajudicial confession alone,
even though the corroborat8
ing evidence need be but slight.'
The distinction has been repeatedly recognized by the courts.
Thus, in State v. Branner,9 it was said:

A plea of guilty is not only an admission of guilt, but is

a formal confession of guilt, before the court in which the defendis arraigned. It is in this respect altogether different from a full
and voluntary confession formally made before a magistrate or to
some other person. The latter is merely evidence of guilt. . . .
When the plea of guilty is formally entered to an indictment, no
evidence of guilt is required in order to proceed to judgment, for
the defendant has himself supplied the necessary proof. He has convicted himself. The judge could, therefore, have entered judgment upon the plea in this case in like manner as he could have done
if there had been a formal verdict of guilty returned by a jury
upon evidence.

Again, in People v. Brown, 20 the court said on this point:
The plea of guilty precluded any such inquiry or taking of evidence as suggested by appellant, because such plea was a conclusive
admission of his guilt of the crime charged as against him ...
We do not desire to be understood as saying that one may be convicted upon his confession alone without further proof of the corpus
delicti; but the plea of guilty in this case removes from consideration such question.

II.

EVIDENCE AS TO AGGRAVATION AND MITIGATION

The taking of evidence as to aggravation and mitigation is
not a trial.
The examination of witnesses for this purpose does not constitute a trial in the ordinary sense of the word. The hearing is
not for the purpose of determining guilt or innocence but has for its
sole object the determination of the degree of punishment of the
prisoner in the light of the circumstances surrounding him. . ..
In deciding this question, this court has held it is not confined to the
"WHARTON,

CRIMINAL

EVIDENCE,

§586

(11th

Ed.).

"Williams v People, 114 Colo. 207, 158 P. (2d)
"149 N. C. 559, 63 S. E. 169 (1908).
"140 Cal. App. 616, 36 P. (2d) 194 (1934).

447

(1945).
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evidence showing guilt, for that issue has been settled by the plea.
The rules of evidence which ordinarily obtain in a trial where guilt
is denied do not bind the court in its inquiry. It may look to the
facts of the killing and it may search anywhere within reasonable
bounds for other facts which tend to aggravate or mitigate the offense.2

The evidence taken as to aggravation and mitigation is different in purpose from that given on a trial of the issue of innocence or guilt. The right to a jury is waived, and with it, of
course, the constitutional guaranties with respect to the conduct
of criminal
trials. A plea of guilty waives any defect not juris22
dictional.
Some of the evidence, of course, may be the same in both
situations, as where the defendant has put his character in issue
and his reputation in that respect is before the jury, or where he
becomes a witness and felony convictions against him are shown,
or where similar offenses by him are properly shown. But in the
main the evidence as to aggravation and mitigation will be different than that which would have been brought forward on a trial
of the issue of guilt.
That evidence in aggravation or mitigation is not limited to
such as would be admissible on a trial of the issue of guilt is
made certain by Smith v. People,2 3 where the question was as to
whether the statutory provision as to taking evidence as to aggravation and mitigation is mandatory. The court held that it is,
but the dissenting opinion was based strictly upon the proposition
that "testimony as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense
should be confined to those matters which would be relevant at
a trial." The majority opinion pointed out, however, that if this
were true, mitigating circumstances "which are usually shown as
appealing to the fairness and mercy of the judge could not be
shown, because wholly irrelevant."
The court, in Smith v. People, had this to say on aggravation
and mitigation:
"Aggravation is defined to be, 'Any circumstance attending the
commission of a crime or tort which increases its guilt or enormity
or adds to its injurious consequences, but which is above and beyond the essential constituents of the crime or tort itself'. Black's Law Dictionary. 'Mitigating circumstances are such as
do not constitute a justification or excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as
extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability.'-Black's
Law Dictionary."
The evidence as to aggravation and mitigation may be as to
matters which, if admissible at all on a trial of the issue of guilt
"People

v. Vincent, 394 Ill. 165, 68 N. E. (2d)
275 (1946).
22 People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N. E. 739 (1931).
2332 Colo. 251, 75 P. 914 (1904).
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or innocence, would be so for a very limited purpose, as, for example, proof of similar offenses to show a system or plan or design
of which the act charged in the information is a part, and to be
considered by the jury for that limited purpose only. Yet such
evidence may be considered by the court in passing sentence because of its bearing on the habits and previous record of the
accused. It is not uncommon for courts in pronouncing judgment
to take into consideration the habits of the defendant, whether
or not his conviction is for a first offense, or whether or not he is
a habitual criminal. Such circumstances surrounding the defendant, if within the knowledge of the court in any way, may properly
be taken into consideration in the exercise of discretion within
the statute in
determining the measure of punishment that should
24
be imposed.
It must be remembered that the statutory requirement applies
only when there is discretion vested in the judge as to punishment.
It does not apply to pleas of guilty to a charge of murder, for in
such case it is the exclusive function of the jury to determine
whether the murder was of the first or c' the second degree, and,
if of the first degree, to fix the punishnit. In those cases, the
evidence taken is circumscribed by the rules of evidence, and, if
the defendant is a minor, must be strictly applied
by the court
25
even though defense counsel fails in his duty.
However, in jurisdictions such as Illinois where the court
may accept a plea of guilty to murder and itself fix the punishment, it may consider evidence which would not be admissible
if the case was being submitted to a jury on such a plea. Thus,
in People v. Popescue,26 where defendants had pleaded guilty to
murder, and the judge, after receiving the pleas and while taking
evidence on aggravation and mitigation, heard the defendants
themselves admit that they had committed another murder three
hours before the crime charged in the indictment. It was urged
that the hearing of this testimony was prejudicial to the defendants and beyond the scope of the court's authority under the statute.
As to this contention the supreme court of Illinois, construing a statute practically identical with that of Colorado, said:
In approaching the issue involved, the distinction between the
respective duties of the court and jury must be constantly borne
in mind. In this state the jury in a homicide case not only have to
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but when they
find him guilty must also fix the punishment. This double duty of
determining both guilt and penalty distinguishes the function of the
jury from that of the court, where on a plea of guilty all questions of
guilt or innocence are disposed of and the only remaining duty is to
determine what penalty to impose.
24Meyers v. People, 65 Colo. 450, 177 P. 145 (1918).
=Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192, 34 P. (2d) 71 (1934).
:345 11. 142, 177 N. E. 739 (1931).
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Under general rules repeatedly reaffirmed by this court, evidence
of separate crimes cannot be admitted in support of another and distinct offense. There are certain well-known exceptions to this rule
which will be discussed later in this opinion, but such separate crimes
are admissible only to show guilt where guilt or innocence is an issue and for no other purpose ....
Even if it were proper for a jury
to hear evidence of other crimes before fixing punishment in homicide cases, where three sentences are discretionary (death, life imprisonment, or any term not less than 14 years), yet such evidence
would be manifestly improper, because it might tend to influence
their decision on the all-important first question to be determined
-i.e., Is the defendant innocent or guilty? Where a jury hears the
evidence, they must at the same time and from the same evidence
determine not only guilt or innocence, but in the same verdict,
if guilt is found, they must also fix the punishment. Once the question of innocence or guilt is decided by a plea of guilty, then no such
compelling reason exists for barring evidence of former crimes from
the trial judge, who then has the heavy and sole responsibility of
examining witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense and of pronouncing judgment ....
Even if it be held that in a trial before a jury it is improper
to receive evidence of other offenses than that charged in the indictment, "it is otherwise when, after a verdict of guilt, the court
is called upon to sentence. In such case the court may of its own
motion take notice of a prior conviction of the defendant on its own
records, or will hear proof of his character and antecedents, either
to aggravate or extenuate his guilt." 3 Wharton's Crim. Proc.
(10th ed.) §1890, p. 320, and many cases cited.

The United States Supreme Court has examined this question
of the difference between evidence admissible at a trial involving
the issue of guilt or innocence and evidence which may be considered by a trial judge in imposing sentence. In Williams v. New
York, 27 the court refused to hold that a death sentence imposed
by a judge who, because of facts brought to his attention through
a probation department report and through other sources on a
pre-sentence investigation, refused to accept a jury's recommendation against imposition of the death penalty, was a violation of
the 14th Amendment. It was claimed there was a failure of due
process in that defendant had been deprived of the right of crossexamination of witnesses against him.
The pre-sentence investigation was made under section 482
of the New York Criminal Code which provided:
Before rendering judgment or pronouncing' sentence the court
shall cause the defendant's previous criminal record to be submitted
to it, including any reports that may have been made as a result
of a mental, psychiatric or physical examination of such person, and
may seek any information that will aid the court in determining
the proper treatment of such defendant.
28
In passing sentence of death, the trial judge,
27 337

bI. S. 241 (1949).

3Id. at 244.
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narrated the shocking details of the crime as shown by the trial evidence, expressing his own complete belief in appellant's guilt. He
stated that the pre-sentence investigation revealed many material
facts concerning appellant's background which though relevant
to the question of punishment could not properly have been brought
to the attention of the jury in its consideration of the question of
guilt. He referred to the experience appellant "had had on 30 other
burglaries in and about the same vicinity" where the murder had
been committed. The appellant had not been convicted of these burglaries although the judge had information that he had confessed
to some and had been identified as the perpetrator of some of the
others. The judge also referred to certain activities of appellant
as shown by the probation report that indicated appellant possessed
"a morbid sexuality" and classified him as a "menace to society."
The accuracy of these statements made by the judge as to apellant's
background and past practices was not challenged by appellant or
his counsel, nor was the judge asked to disregard any of them by
cross-examination or otherwise. The case presents a serious and
difficult question. The question relates to the rules of evidence applicable to the manner in which a judge may obtain information to
guide him in the imposition of sentence upon already convicted defendants.

The court continued:29
Tribunals passing on the guilt of a defendant always have been
hedged in by strict evidentiary procedural limitations. But both
before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in
this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and
types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and
extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.
Out-of-court affidavits have been used frequently, and of course in
the smaller communities sentencing judges naturally have in mind
their knowledge of the personalities and backgrounds of convicted
offenders. A recent manifestation of the historical latitude allowed
sentencing judges apears in Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
procedure. The rule provides for consideration by federal judges of
reports made by probation officers containing information about a
convicted defendant, including such information "as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant ..
"
In addition to the historical basis for different evidentiary
rules governing trial and sentencing procedures there are sound
practical reasons for the distinction. In a trial before verdict the
issue is whether the defendant is guilty of having engaged in certain criminal conduct of which he has been specifically accused.
Rules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials which narrowly confine the trial contest to evidence that is strictly relevant to
the particular offense charged. These rules rest in part on a necessity to prevent a time consuming and confusing trial of collateral
issues. They were also designed to prevent tribunals concerned
solely with the issue of guilt of a particular offense from being
influenced to convict for that offense by evidence that the defendant had habitually engaged in other misconduct. A sentencing judge,
however, is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within
fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type
and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined.
Id. at 246.
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PRIVILEGE OF TAKING EVIDENCE CAN BE WAIVED

In Arrano v. People,30 it was held that the provision of the
statute requiring examination of witnesses as to aggravation and
mitigation of the offense is mandatory, and that the record must
affirmatively show that this was done.
In Smith v. People,3 1 the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge
of perjury in a former case. At the sentencing, witnesses were
present for the purpose of giving evidence as to aggravation and
mitigation, but the judge refused to take the testimony because, he
said, he had presided at the trial in which the perjury occurred and
all of the facts regarding it were within his knowledge. The situation, then, was that the court was requested to comply with the
statute and refused. The supreme court reversed the judgment
of conviction, saying that the taking of such evidence was mandatory.

But although the cases say that examination of witnesses in
such circumstances is "mandatory," and that "the failure to make
such examination is a good ground of complaint in a direct attack
upon the sentence,' 3 2 nevertheless, if the court had jurisdiction of
the offense and of the convicted person, a judgment rendered in
such a case, though all the requirements as to procedure were not
followed, is merely irregular and voidable, not void. 33 There is a
distinction between a void and an erroneous judgment, and the
general rule is that where the court has jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the person, its judgment in the case will not be void,
although it may be erroneous, and that in a collateral proceeding
the validity of the judgment cannot be called in question. 34 In Lakomy v. People,'3 5 the question arose as to proof of a former conviction in a liquor case, and the court refused to inquire into the validity of the former conviction despite the claim that the statutory
examination had not been made by the trial court.
Accordingly, if a failure to examine witnesses as to aggrevation and mitigation merely makes the judgment "irregular," and
not "void," it would seem that a defendant may advisedly and expressly waive such examination and allow the court to inform itself in some other manner.
The Illinois supreme court, in construing the same statute,
has held that while the provision is mandatory, it may nevertheless be waived by the defendant. They have held, it will be seen,
that there is a waiver of examination when the defendant fails to
demand it, but it is unnecessary to go that far here. Nothing
in Smith v. People, supra, militates against the idea that the examination may be expressly waived by the defendant, for that
3024

Colo. 233, 49 P.

271 (1897).

8Supra, note 23.
32Lakomy v. People, 66 Colo. 19, 178 P. 571
s3Ibid.
4 Hart v.

Best, 119 Colo. 569,

5 Supra, note 32.

205 P.

(2d)

(1919).
787

(1949).
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case turned upon the point that the defendant requested such
examination and the court refused it.
Having in mind that the Colorado statute is essentially identical with that of Illinois, the following Illinois cases will be found
to be in point on this question of waiver:
In People v. Pennington,30 it was said:
That part of section 4 of division 13 of the Criminal Code making it the duty of the court to examine witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense in cases where the party pleads
guilty is mandatory, and it is necessary for the court to make such
examination when requested or desired, either on the part of the
people or of the defendant. This is a privilege which may be waived
by the parties, and some other method of supplying the court with
the information be substituted in its stead. Should the court fail
to perform its duty in this regard, or should it be claimed that the
punishment was more severe than the circumstances shown would
warrant, such matters must be presented for review by a bill of
exceptions.

In People v. Crooks,37 the defendant was a minor. The Illinois
court said:
The defendant contends that the said motion ought to have been
sustained on three legal grounds: the first being that under section
4 of division 13 of the Criminal Code (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1925, c.
38, §732) in all cases where there is a plea of guilty and the court
possesses any discretion as to the extent of the punishment, it
shall be the duty of the court to examine witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense. In the case of People v. Pennington, 267 Ill. 45, 107 N. E. 871, this court held that it is necessary
for the court to make such examination when requested or desired
by either the people or the defendant. This court further held in
that case that the privilege given-by the statute is one that might be
waived by the parties and some other method of supplying the court
with the necessary information be substituted. The privilege was
waived in this case by both the defendant and the state, as neither
of them asked nor desired any other witness to be examined. The
court on its own motion ascertained all further, facts that appeared
necessary for it to know, by information given it by both the state's
attorney and by the attorney for the defendant. The fact that the defendant is a minor does not preclude him from making any waiver
that might have been made in -the case of an adult.

The Illinois cases go so far as to say that if a defendant fails
to ask that evidence be taken in aggravation and mitigation,
he waives the right. Such undoubtedly would not be true in Colorado in view of the ruling in Arrano v. People, supra, that the
record must affirmatively show that such evidence was taken. But
the Illinois cases do support the proposition advanced here that
a defendant may advisedly and expressly waive that privilege and
that the court may advise itself from other sources.
30267 I1. 45, 107 N. E. 871 (1915).
3,326 Ii1. 266, 157 N. E. 218 (1927). As to a minor waiving his rights and pleading guilty after being fully informed of his rights, see Reppin v. People, supra, note 25,
death penalty case.
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PROSECUTION OF HABITUAL CRIMINALS
WILLIAM E. DOYLE
of the Denver Bar, Chief Deputy District Attorney

The statute which prescribes proceedings for punishment of
second and subsequent offenders, commonly called the Habitual
Criminal Act,' provides in substance that where a person is convicted of a felony and that individual has been previously twice
convicted of a felony in this state or elsewhere, or of a crime
elsewhere which would be a felony here, he shall be adjudged an
habitual criminal and shall be sentenced to a term of not less than
the maximum nor more than three times the maximum on a first
conviction. If there have been three or more prior convictions, the
punishment prescribed is that of life in prison. It ought to be
noted at the outset that this is not a double prosecution for the
same offense; it rather involves proof of a condition for the
purpose of aggravation of sentence. The case of Smalley v.
People 2 sets at rest these questions of constitutional law.
Two fact questions arise in this type of prosecution. First,
is the prior conviction of the grade of felony in Colorado or elsewhere, or is it an offense elsewhere which would be a felony in
Colorado? Secondly, is the defendant the identical individual
who is alleged to have suffered the prior conviction? This paper
primarily will explore methods to be employed in meeting these
issues. It will also review briefly the other procedures.
The information alleges in one or more counts the offense
with which the accused is presently charged. Additional separate
counts describe prior convictions and contain the alleged date,
place, the name of the trial judge before whom the prior case was
tried, the offense for which conviction was had and the institution
wherein the accused was confined. 3 At the time of arraignment, the
alleged prior convictions are read separately to the defendant,
11935 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 48, §555 (1949 Supp.).
,116 Colo. 598, 183 P. (2d) 558 (1947).
3A sample habitual criminal count is as follows:
BERT M. KEATING, District Attorney, In the name and by the authority
of the People of the State of Colorado, further informs the Court that on the
........ day of .------............... A. D. 19 ....... at the City of ----------------State of.........
(or City and County of Denver, State of Colorado) by and before the Honorable
......................
who was then and there a judge of ................... State of .....................
and one of the competent authorities in the premises, (Defendant) by the name
of
.................
was duly and legally convicted of violating the ......................
Statute of the State of ....................... and on the ............... day of ....................... I
A. D. 19 ....... was sentenced to (Name of Institution), and judgment of conviction
was entered on said date, which sentence was duly executed and the defendant
confined in the State (Name of Institution) at (City), (State), pursuant to
said sentence; (contrary to the form of the statute In such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the people of the State of Colorado.)
See Wright v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 181 P. (2d) 477 (1947) to the effect that the
final clause In parenthesis above is harmless surplusage, habitual criminality being a
condition or state and not a separate crime within the requirements of Art. VI, Sec.
23, of the Colorado Constitution.
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and as to each such prior conviction he is asked whether he is
the same person who suffered the prior conviction in the manner
and form described in the information. An affirmative response
is tantamount to a plea of guilty, thus eliminating any extended
proof as to identity. The defendant may deny that he is the same
person or he may refuse to answer. In either case the effect is
the same, i.e., a general issue plea is entered, and the issues of
fact which are thus raised are reserved for trial to a jury. The
case of Smalley v. People,4 is instructive on this question of absolute necessity for specific arraignment as to such prior conviction. The Supreme Court condemned the practice of a general
admission of identity as to all counts.
SEPARATE TRIAL NECESSARY WHERE DENIAL OF IDENTITY

In the event of admission of identity there is no issue for the
jury's consideration. The trial judge is simply required to receive
the proofs of prior conviction of a felony. If there is a denial of
identity, this question must be presented to a jury. Under the
early act, the Supreme Court held that this issue should be decided in the trial of the immediate charge.5 The method which
is to be followed under the present act is outlined in the case of
Routa v. People, 1 wherein it is held that the question of guilt
must be determined by the jury before the issue of prior convictions
can be submitted. It is pointed out in the Routa case that the question of former convictions is "opened for consideration and resolution" in the main trial where the accused takes the witness
stand and subjects himself to cross-examination and impeachment.
In other words, if the accused is willing to forego his right to
testify in his own behalf, he may have his guilt or innocence on
the main charge considered separate and apart from the question
of habitual criminality.
PROOF WHERE ACCUSED ADMITS IDENTITY

A plea of guilty does not obviate the necessity for proving
the prior felony conviction, particularly where it is a foreign conviction. This question was settled in the case of O'Day v. People.7
There the accused admitted that he had been convicted of
violating the burglary statutes of California in one count and of
Missouri in another count. The trial court neglected to hear
evidence on this question, and the Supreme Court held that this
was error. The reason set forth by the higher court was that
Colorado courts need not notice the statutes of other states and
hence there must be proof, at least that the crime was a felony.
It was said:
4Supra, Note 2.
a People v. Wolff, 111 Colo. 46, 137 P. (2d)
.117 Colo. 564, 192 P. (2d) 436 (1948).
114 Colo. 373, 166 P.

(2d)

789

(1946).

693 (1943).
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What "the Burglary Statutes" of the states of California and Missouri are we are not advised. It should be noted that section 551, supra
sets forth certain crimes known to our law and then provides, "which
under the laws of this state would amount to a felony; or, under
the laws of any other state, government or county, of a crime which
if committed within this state, would be such a felony . . ."
Would the violation of the "Burglary Statutes" of the states of California and Missouri, of which it is alleged the defendant was convicted, be one of the felonies enumerated in section 551, supra,
if they had been committed in the state of Colorado? A fair construction of this statute places the burden upon the people to prove
that the defendant is the identical person named in the second and
third counts of the information, and this proof was obviated by the
defendant's admission. The burden also was upon the people
to establish by competent evidence that the defendant had been convicted of crimes in California and Missouri which, if committed
in Colorado, would be one of the felonies specifically mentioned in
section 551, supra, and such proof is entirely lacking. In the absence
of this proof, the court committed error in considering, if it did,
the charges in the second and third counts in the information.

Thus, it would follow that even after a plea of guilty, it is
necessary for the state to satisfy the trial court as to the fact
of conviction and also that the offense was a felony. Proof of the
conviction is relatively a simple matter. Section 555 (2) provides :8
On any trial under the provisions of this subdivision, a duly
authenticated copy of the record of former convictions and judgments
of any court of record for any of said crimes against the party indicted or informed against shall be prima facie evidence of such convictions and may be used in evidence against such party.

If the conviction is a local one, i.e., within the county where
the trial is being conducted, the clerk can produce the judgment
book as to name, date, etc., and testify from that. Where the
convicion takes place outside the county or state, the above statute
comes into play, and the authenticated copy is evidence.
The issue of whether the crime was of the grade of felony is
less simple. If the prior conviction occurred in Colorado, the trial
court can, without straining its eyesight, notice this fact. If,
however, it is an out-of-state conviction, the district attorney
must introduce evidence to this point. He may choose to qualify
an expert and have him testify that he has examined the statute
and that he is of the opinion that the crime specified therein is
a felony. However, a more simple approach would be to introduce in evidence an official compilation of the laws of the other
state.9 The foreign statute can be compared with the definition
of a felony which is found in the Colorado Constitution, Art.
XVIII. If confinement in a state penal institution is provided
in the foreign statute, this definition is complied with.
Due to the severity of the punishment under this act and hence
the close scrutiny to which such convictions are subjected, it is
'1935

'These

COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 48, §555(2) (1949 Supp.).
are rendered competent by COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 68, §1 (1935).
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suggested that a careful record should be made and proofs offered as to every material issue even though the accused admits
identity and thus in effect enters a plea of guilty.
PROOF REQUIRED WHERE ACCUSED DENIES IDENTITY

The problems are much more difficult where the general issue
plea is entered either by an express denial of identity or by the
entry of the denial by the trial court where the accused remains
mute. The issues are the same as noted above, but more care
must be exercised in meeting them. The fact of conviction at the
time and place alleged is again established at least prima facie
by production of the judgment roll or an authenticated copy
thereof, and proof that it is a felony proceeds as outlined above,
but there remains the vital question of whether the accused is
the identical man. If witnesses are available who know of their
own knowledge that he is the same individual, little else is necessary. Arresting officers who were present in court at the time
of the conviction or the judge or clerk are possible witnesses to
this fact. Other possibilities include the warden or a guard from
the institution. They can testify that the accused was received
pursuant to the judgment of conviction. As a further link in the
chain of evidence, the custodian of records of the institution
can identify the photograph and fingerprints of the person who
is alleged to have been an inmate. He should testify that he is required to prepare and keep these records and that he does so systematically and as a matter of routine, and that the particular records were kept in accordance with the established requirements.
Known fingerprints and photographs should then be identified by
the person who made them at the time of the arrest. Comparison of
the fingerprints which were taken at the institution with those
which are known to be the prints of the accused by an expert
together with his opinion that the prints are of the same individual
will complete the chain of identification.
PROOF OF FOREIGN CONVICTIONS DIFFICULT

The difficulties increase where the conviction occurred outside of Colorado. Authenticated copies of the judgment are, of
course, admissible to prove the conviction. 10 Also, the official compilation of the laws of the foreign state are admissible." There
remains, however, the ever troublesome problem of proof of
identification. This is a difficult matter of practice because of the
frequent impossibility of securing the presence of officers from
foreign institutions. Even if the officers are willing to attend, the
operation is expensive and perhaps not warranted in view of the
fact that his testimony is limited to identification of the photo101935
11COLO.

COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 48, §655(2)
STAT. ANN., C. 63, §1 (1935).

(1949

Supp.).
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graph and prints as officlal records of the institution. Another
reason why presence of a witness of this type seems unimportant
is that there is practically no area for defense cross-examination.
Thus it would seem that the presence of the officer could well
be dispensed with.
12
One well-reasoned decision from the state of Washington,
State v. Johnson, has approved a trial technique which allows the
introduction of fingerprints and photographs as official records.
This excellent opinion explains that the basis for allowing such
evidence to be introduced is found in the Constitution of the
United States, Art. IV, Sec. 1, which provides that "Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records
and Judicial Proceedings of every other State." That section
also declares that Congress may by general laws prescribe the
manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect thereof. Congress has enacted a measure which
implements this provision to the effect that:13
All records and exemplifications of books, which may be kept
in any public office of any State or Territory, or of any country
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, not appertaining to
a court, shall be proved or admitted in any court or office in any
other State or Territory, or in any such country, by the attestation of the keeper of the said records or books, and the seal of his
office annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the
presiding justice of the court of the county, parish, or district in
which such office may be kept, or of the governor, or secretary of
state, the chancellor or keeper of the great seal, of the State, or Territory, or country, that the said attestation is in due form, and by
the proper officers. If the certificate is given the presiding justice
of a court, it shall be further authenticated by the clerk or prothonotary of the said court, who shall certify Under his hand and the seal
of his office, that the said presiding justice is duly commissioned and
qualified; or, if given such governor, secretary, chancellor, or
keeper of the great seal, it shall be under the great seal of the
State, Territory, or country aforesaid in which it is made. And the
said records and exemplifications so authenticated, shall have such
faith and credit given to them in every court and office within the
United States as they have by law or usage in the courts or offices
of the State, Territory, or country, as aforesaid, from which they
are taken.

This statute is made to order for the instant procedure. Certainly, fingerprints and photographs are records within the deflinition of the above statute. The warden is a public officer who is
empowered to attest that he is the keeper of the photographic and
fingerprint records of persons convicted of crime and imprisoned in his institution, that the fingerprints are kept in conformity
with law, and that the particular record is that of an inmate who
was incarcerated in the institution at the particular time. The
certificate of the judge in the county or district or of the Governor
2State v. Johnson, 194 Wash. 438, 78 P. (2d)

13R. S. 8906, 28 U. S. C. §688.

561 (1938).
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or Secretary of State as to the official character of the warden and
as to his duties fulfills the other terms of the above quoted statute.
If the documents which are described above are received, there
remains the relatively simple task of introducing the known photos
and prints for comparison and opinion by an expert, and thus
the same evidentiary effect is achieved as that which is accomplished by the presence of the officer or officers.
In the case of State v. Johnson, 14 the procedure which is
outlined above was followed and approved. The conclusion of
the court is as follows:
We conclude, therefore, that the method of proving the identity
of the appellant by introducing certified copies of the fingerprints
of the defendant, and then comparing them with the known prints
in the possession of the witness, was proper and in accordance with
the rules of evidence as approved by the great weight of authority.",

To the contention that this procedure deprives the accused
of his right to confront his accuser, it was said "Documentary
evidence is admissible, and its admission is not in derogation of the
defendant's right to meet his accusing witness face to face for
the simple reason that a document is not a witness."
It is submitted that the use of documents to prove identity
where the convictions are foreign is entirely sound. Such evidence
is well within an exception to the hearsay rule, and, as is pointed
out above, the accuser is not deprived of any substantial right from
the standpoint of cross-examination. The evidence is highly trustworthy, the necessity is apparent, and the right of cross-examination is not impaired. Therefore, if the documents are carefully
drafted, there seems to be every reason for admitting them.
In closing this discussion, one brief word of admonition is in
order. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that this
statute is in derogation of the common law and hence is subject to
14Note 12, supra.

15In State v. Johnson, the court described the forms (which
therein

as

follows:

The

certificate

of

the

warden,

omitting

it approved)

formal

parts,

used
was:

"I am keeper and custodian of fingerprint and photographic records of persons convicted of crime and imprisoned in said prison, and that the said fingerprint and photographic records are kept by me on my files In conformity with law. I further certify

that the annexed is a true copy of an original fingerprint and photographic record
now on file in

this prison; that I have compared the transcript hereto annexed

with

the said original records, and I certify that the same Is a true and correct transcript
of the said original record and of the whole thereof."
There was attached to the warden's certificate the judge's certificate which, folIs the Warlowing the name of the warden, so far as pertinent, was as follows: .....
den at the above mentioned Prison and hath the keeping and custody of the fingerprints, photographs, files and records of the said Prison; that he is by law the proper

officer to make out and certify and attest copies of fingerprints, photographs, filesand
records of said Prison; that full faith and credit are and ought to be given to his
acts and attestations done as aforesaid, and that his certificate of attestation to the
fingerprints and photograph hereto annexed is in due form; that he was such
Warden, Custodian and

going attestation and

Keeper at the time of making and subscribing to the fore-

certificate."

A certificate was attached by the clerk to the effect that the one who signed
the last certificate was a judge, and the presiding judge certifiied as to the identity of

the clerk. These documents bear the seal of the court from which they emanated.
The certificates of the officials in both states are essentially the same.
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strict construction. It follows that the utmost care must be exercised whether the plea is that of guilty or not guilty. In fact,
the statute is so severe that it should be invoked with restraint
and only against the hoodlum10 who commits aggravated crime and
tends to escape detection and and prosecution and is thus a social
menace. In my opinion, this procedure was not intended for use
against the petty offender who is readily caught and who invariably pleads guilty. If prosecutions are selected and tried
with care, the convictions which follow will receive better treatment on review.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PRESS IN
CRIMINAL CASES
MICHAEL G. RYAN*

What is the duty of the press in criminal cases? Those versed
in the traditions of the law would answer this question by saying
that since a crime is "An act committed or omitted in violation
of a public law forbidding or commanding it; a wrong which the
government notices as injurious to the public, and punishes in
what is called a criminal proceeding in its own name,"" the guilt
or innocence of one accused of an offense against the state should
be determined through utilization of time-tested criminal trial
procedures, and the press should interfere with these procedures
as little as possible.
That the press has a duty toward the public in handling
news of criminal proceedings is undeniable, but this duty is a
moral obligation or responsibility which always cannot be enforced by law. That some sections of the press seek to discharge
this obligation with a deep sense of responsibility to their readers
is one of the main reasons for the continued success of democratic
society. That other sections of the press do not handle criminal
cases with appropriate moderation is equally obvious.
Freedom of the press is a right secured by the Constitution of
the United States and protected by state constitutions.
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press, or the right of the people to peacefully assemble ....I
No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every
person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on
any subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty; and in
all suits and prosecutions for libel the truth thereof may be given in
evidence, and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the fact.,
10 CI. Routa v. People, supra, note 6.
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.

Bouvier's Law Dictionary, unabridged, Vol. 1, p. 729.
United States, First Amendment.
Constitution of Colorado, Art. II, Sec. 10.

2 Constitution of the
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Under the accepted doctrine of freedom of the press there
is no previous censorship or restraint on the press in handling
of a criminal story on its merits according to the way the press
sees it. Publication should be with good motives and for justifiable4
ends whether it respects government, magistracy, or individuals.
In Patterson v. Colorado,5 the court held that the main purpose
of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press was to
prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been
practiced by other governments, to insure immunity from previous
restraints or censorship.
Freedom of the press includes not only exemption from censorship, but also security against laws enacted by the legislative branch
of the government or measures resorted to by either of the other
branches for the purpose of stifling just criticism or muzzling public opinion.0 It has become firmly settled that the right of freedom
of the press, guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, is among the fundamental rights and liberties protected by the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the states.7 Under the guarantees of freedom
of the press, it is generally recognized that the public has the right
to know and discuss all judicial proceedings, unless such right is
expressly interdicted by constitutional provision, or unless the
publication is of such nature as to obstruct or embarrass the court
in its administration of the law."
THE NEED FOR PUBLIC SCRUTINY

Mr. Justice Holmes elaborated on the philosophy underlying
the doctrine of freedom of the press when he said:
It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under
the public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with
another are of public concern, but because it is of the highest
moment that those who administer justice should always act under
the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should
be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which
a public duty is performed.0

This idea was expressed by the Colorado Supreme Court in
People v. News-Times Publishing Co. '0 in the following language:
"It is not a crime in this state to speak, write, or publish the truth
concerning the official conduct of public officers."
It has long been realized that suppression of freedom of the
press could be extended to include personal communication. Dr.
Zechariah Chafee, Langdell Professor of Law at Harvard and recognized authority on civil rights in the United States, has stated
that restraints on publication must be in relation to the safety of
111 Am. Jud. 1111.
:205 U.

S. 454,

27

S. C. 556

(1907).

'Note 4 supra; Coleman v. McLellan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
7DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 S. C. 255 (1937); Grosjean

Press Co., 299 U. S. 233, 56 S. C. 444 (1936).
:11 Am. Jur. 1112.
9 Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884).
2035 Colo. 253 (1906).
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the state, and that restraint is not justified until the wrong of
* publication has been committed. Dr. Chafee has indicated that
the purpose of the bar to previous restraint is to allow any person
in authority, including members of the judiciary, to be 'brought
before the just bar of public opinion. 1
From the fact that a public trial is guaranteed to all those
charged with crimes, it follows that the doors of the courtroom
should be kept open to the public. Restrictions which might be
imposed upon admission of the general public to a trial do not offer
sufficient justification for a court's refusel to allow publication
of accounts of trials.12 The public has a right to know and to discuss all judicial proceedings. The press and other delineators of
mass information are the most appropriate vehicles for enabling
the public to know what goes on in the courts. It is well established that a court cannot keep
from the newspapers information
13
contained in public records.
PROTECTION FROM ABUSES OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Freedom of the press, like freedom of speech, is not a perfect
or absolute right. It is subject to reasonable restrictions in the
public interest. The fact that freedom of the press may be abused
the fact that freedom of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any less necessary the immunity
from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct. 14 Some
degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of any right.
Freedom of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion
if, while every many was at liberty to publish what he pleased,
the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for utterly
harmless publications.
There has never been unlimited police power to suppress news
accounts of criminal trials. Such police power growing out of
statutory authorization has to bear a tangible relation to the
health, comfort, morals, welfare or safety of the public. The
public has an inherent right to know how its courts are functioning. If the public is not adequately informed, the way is open for
unlicensed invasions of the rights of those charged with crime,
without the restraining influence of an alert public opinion. Suppression of information regarding a criminal trial is tantamount
to denial of freedom of thought and expression.
Although the great blessings of freedom of the press are
recognized and universally protected in this country, abuse of that
liberty is a great evil against which the people are entitled to be
protected.' 5 The full power of the state to protect the administration of justice by its courts has never been fully tested. It can
"Free Speech in the United States," Harvard University Press, 1941.
"In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 256, 34 P. 227 (1893).
"Bend Publishing Co. v. Haner, 244 P. 868 (1926).
14Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. C. 625 (1931).
1People v. Stapleton, 18 Colo. 568 (1893).
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be assumed, however, that such power is great and is open to.
statutory extension and improvement.
It must always be determined whether a provocative publication regarding a criminal case is made with a view toward influencing the results of a trial. This presents an almost insurmountable evidentiary problem. In the final analysis, when there has been
a clear abuse by a newspaper of its hard-won and time-honored
privilege of freedom, the question is whether the privilege of free
discussion outweighs the interests of both the state and the defendant in a fair trial. This becomes the inevitable question, and only
responsible handling of crime and allied news can obviate the
necessity for asking it.
It has been said that freedom of the press is not interfered
with except by suppression of newspaper accounts before publication. 16 Holding the press to rules of reporting in criminal trials
by means of laying down conditions under which a trial could be
reported would be unconstitutional as a prior restraint on the
press. Previous restraint on the press is a more serious breach
of the First Amendment than would be
subsequent punishment of
17
a newspaper for abuse of its freedom.
When freedom of the press is used in such a way as to become license, what are the constitutional protections of the state
or the individuals concerned? Answering the question of the relative desirability of having causes tried by the courts or by the
newspapers, a Colorado court once observed, "Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an
impartial tribunal,
uninfluenced by newspaper dictation or popu8
lar clamor.'
In State v. Pioneer Press Co. 19 a Minnesota supreme court
held that there is ". . . no restraint upon the power of the legislature to punish for publication of matter which is injurious to society according to the standard of the common law," and that
the state is not deprived, by the doctrine of freedom of the press,
of its primary right of self-preservation. Freedom° of the press
has been held subordinate to judicial independence.2
In 1893 the Colorado Supreme Court was none to gentle with
the press of that day when it said in People v. Stapleton:
Thoughtful citizens know very well that there is far more danger
to our institutions, and far more danger to the rights of the people,.
and especially to the rights of litigants, to be apprehended from the
power of the press over the courts, than from the power of the
courts over the press."
V. Kiely, 44 F. (2d) 227 (1930).
17Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. C. 625 (1931.).
IsCooper v. People, 13 Colo. 337 (1889).
19110 N. W. 867 (1907).
"In re Independent Publishing Co., 240 F. 849 (9th Cir. 1917).
218
Colo. 568 (1893).
16Gitlow
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ACTIONS DEEMED TO BE INTERFERENCE WITH JUSTICE

The following actions are considered a substantial interference
with the administration of justice: polling the public during a
trial regarding the guilt or innocence of accused; partisan presentation; innuendos of jury-fixing by one side; threatening a judge
with defeat in succeeding election; publishing suggestions regarding impeachment of judge.
The remedies for such activities appear to be voluntary selfdiscipline by the press; action by aggrieved against newspaper;
change of venue; more careful screening of jury; lock-up of jury to
protect from undue influence; working agreement on handling of
criminal cases and news involving similar problems through 22understanding between bar associations and newspaper editors.
A new trial may be granted when the trial court estimates
that the damage by press influence has been serious to the cause
of the losing party. Actual influence does not have to be shown,
only that the press tone was calculated to influence, and that the
jury was subjected to this influence by having an opportunity to
read articles, or that it was in a position to be so influenced due
to separation for the night.
Punishing a publication for contempt, for harrassing the
courts and judicial officials thereof, has been resorted to frequently
in England, but such practice is virtually non-existent in this
country. In England, use of the contempt power is resorted to
in punishing publications for interference with impartial decisions
of cases pending, that is, from the time the accused is brought
before a migistrate before indictment. Mention of a purported
confession and publication of prior criminal record of accused are
severely dealt with by English courts. 23 Constructive contempt
power is limited by statutes in the United States, and contempt
has seldom been found except in cases occurring "in presence of
court" or where tactics have been openly obstructionist to the
administration of justice. Interference with judicial process has
been found where the jury, as well as the judge, has been subjected to pressure.
HARDY JUDGES NEEDED TO RESIST PRESS INFLUENCE

It can be argued that newspaper influence on criminal decisions is negligible where the judicial officer is endowed with
wisdom and strength of character as well he should be in essaying
to fulfill judicial responsibility. Mr. Justice Douglas is among
those who feel we are over-tender in our zeal to protect the judiciary:
The Part Newspapers Play in the Administration of Justice, 8 J. Am. Jud. Soc.
(1924).
' Arthur L.
Goodhart, "Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law."
48 Harv. L. R. 855 (1936).
2
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h . . the law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges
who
may tobebesensitive
the winds
Judges
are4
supposed
men of to
fortitude,
able of
to public
thrive opinion.
in a hardy
climate.

The judge, as an educated, trained, and impartial individual,
must rise above the verbiage of legal battle in the courtroom
to determine the rulings of law applicable. He must also rise
above all exterior clamor to protect the accused from oppressive
verdicts. His judicious spirit should be the dominant influence in
spite of the din of press or public for a certain decision.
An example of a newspaper's policy regarding coverage of
crime with which the author is familiar is that of the Denver Post.
Managing Editor Edmund J. Dooley states: "We . . . handle crime
stories as objectively as we know how, and display them in the
paper on their merits." Offensiveness in crime is avoided. "Objectivity," crux of any fair policy on crime coverage, might be
defined as grasping and representing facts as they are, unbiased
by prejudice or temperament, or apart from the author's or newspaper's own personality.
It is established Denver Post policy, as it is with other responsible sections of the press, not to use the names of youths and
children under 18 years of age in connection with criminal cases.
Exception is made in major murder cases wherein the court may
determine permission because of public knowledge. Courts may allow identification of youths and children where public knowledge
is already an accomplished fact, and where it is felt that such
identification may serve as a deterrent to others.
The press looks upon crime as a fact, something which, unfortunately, is here to stay. Because it is such a prevalent fact
of everyday life, it should be treated objectively. This is a fair
attitude, and if universally adhered to, would lead to no harrassment of judicial officials, nor would there be that type of coverage
which might tend to exert an indirect influence over criminal decisions. The verdict in a criminal case should never be, primarily,
the general verdict of the political community as interpreted by
the press.
INVENTORY CONTROL REGULATION ISSUED BY NPA
Acting under the Defense Production Act of 1950, the National Production Authority of the U. S. Department of Commerce
issued Regulation No. 1, governing inventory control, on September
18. Copies of the regulation are available to interested parties at
the regional office of the department, 210 Boston Bldg., Denver.
This office serves as field representative of the NPA, and through
its director, Charles E. Brokaw, has extended an invitation to
supply such information as is available on questions in connection
with operations under the Defense Production Act.
24

Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, (1947).

OCTOBER IS A MONTH OF CAUSES
-GOOD CAUSES
Both The Community Chest and The United Nations
Have Their Campaigns This Month
SUPPORT THEM BOTH AND KEEP THE HOME FIRES
BURNING ALL OVER THE WORLD

7hanks for
the Smile in
Your Voice
Often we hear comments-'
on the courtesy of telephone people-and we're
mighty glad to have them.
For our part, we would like
to say a word about the courtesy of those who use the
telephone.

4

Your cooperation is always a big help in maintaining
good telephone service and we want you to know how
much we appreciate it.

The Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
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Who Gets The Welfare
In A "Welfare State"?
That's easy. There's a formula. You've seen it. Be sure you
recognize it next time. Here's how it goes:
Somebody promises to give you something (a subsidy, or a
wage increase without a production increase), if you'll give
him a little something in return-just a little something-a
vote, perhaps.
So, you give and you get. Or you think you do. Maybe what
you get increases the national debt or decreases corporation
profits. What do you care? Let's see:
National debt? That's mortgaging your child's future. Let
the rich pay it? That's silly. Take every penny every one of
them has, and you wouldn't make more than a dent in the
national debt. Every dollar added to it by the giveaway
bureaucrats has to be paid back by you and your children
and your grandchildren.
Take it out of corporation profits? If all the profits of all the
corporations were taken, you would pay only a tiny fraction
of the national debt.
The plain truth is that no one is giving you anything. Last
year it was reported that the federal government "gave" to
the states five and a half billion dollars. That money, of
course, first came from the states. But we are informed
$625,000,000 of it never got back to the states-that was the
cost of taking it away from you, and giving part of it back.
When anyone promises you something for nothing, you can be
sure he gets a lot of the something, and you get a lot of the
nothing.
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CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
by ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN.
A Masterpiece by Today's Master Authority
Exhaustively covering every conceivable principle of substantive and procedural contract low, it also embraces such
specific fields as the Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule.
-

44 Main Subjects

Accord and Satisfaction
Aleatory Contracts
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